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CIVIL RIGHTS
OVERVIEW
This was a significant survey period for the Tenth Circuit in the area
of civil rights. The court examined the controversial issue of immunity
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for prosecutors and
police officers. Also under section 1983, the court decided that forensic
patients, like prisoners, have a constitutional right of adequate access to
the courts. Under Title VII, the court established a prima facie test for
determining discrimination in an academic setting. And, under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the court found that plain-
tiffs can collect future damages and applied the Supreme Court test for
determining an employer's willfulness in violating the ADEA.
I. SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
Section 19831 places personal liability upon any person who, acting
under color of state law, violates constitutional or other federally pro-
tected rights of another person. The Tenth Circuit further defined its
parameters in the three cases discussed below.
A. The Absolute Immunity Defense to a Violation of a Constitutional Right:
Rex v. Teeples
Rex v. Teeples 2 examined the threshold question of whether a section
1983 claimant had suffered a violation of his constitutional rights, and
whether, in turn, one of the defendants was entitled to the absolute im-
munity defense afforded to prosecutors.
Randall Rex brought a section 1983 civil rights action against Police
Officer John Teeples and Chief Deputy District Attorney Donald John-
son, contending that Teeples violated his constitutional due process
rights by having him held under a state mental health statute, and that
Teeples and Johnson violated his due process rights by coercing him to
confess involuntarily.3 The district court granted summary judgment
for both Teeples and Johnson, concluding that Johnson, as prosecutor,
had absolute immunity, and that the mental health hold and allegedly
coerced confession did not constitute constitutional violations and were
1. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982),
provides:
Every person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
2. 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 332 (1985).
3. Id. at 841.
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only cognizable under state tort law.4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the facts in the light most
favorable to Rex, the party opposing summary judgment. Rex was hos-
pitalized after trying to commit suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning.
Teeples, a local police officer, suspected Rex of a local kidnapping,
questioned him,5 and directed a doctor to place Rex under a seventy-
two hour "mental health hold,"'6 allegedly because he did not yet have
probable cause to make an arrest but still wanted to question Rex. After
Rex was transferred to a second hospital, District Attorney Johnson ad-
vised Rex of his Miranda rights. 7 Rex allegedly signed a waiver of those
rights and then Teeples, and to a lesser extent, Johnson, interrogated
Rex. Rex eventually confessed to the kidnapping. Rex alleged that
Teeples and Johnson took advantage of his disorientation caused by the
suicide attempt, deceived him into believing that he was not a suspect,
and convinced him to talk without his attorney being present.8 Rex was
later charged with attempted murder, second degree kidnapping and
third degree sexual assault.9 Ultimately, he was not convicted of any of
these crimes.' 0
The Tenth Circuit had three issues to consider on appeal of the
district court's summaryjudgment forJohnson and Teeples: 1) whether
the alleged circumstances surrounding the seventy-two hour hold could
support a section 1983 claim of deprivation of liberty without due pro-
cess; 2) whether the alleged circumstances surrounding Rex's confes-
sion could support a section 1983 claim of deprivation of liberty without
due process; and, 3) whether District Attorney Johnson's role in ob-
taining the confession entitled him to absolute immunity from the sec-
tion 1983 claim. The court answered the first two questions
affirmatively, the third negatively and reversed and remanded for fur-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 844 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
6. Under Colorado law, when a person appears to be mentally ill and appears to
present imminent danger to himself or others, a professional person, upon probable
cause, may place him in an approved facility for a seventy-two hour treatment and evalua-
tion. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 27-10-105(1)(a) (Supp. 1984).
7. 753 F.2d at 841-42. The Colorado Court of Appeals has stated that Teeples did
not question Rex about the kidnapping until after Rex was under the mental health hold
and had been advised of his Miranda rights. People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (reversing the defendant's conviction for second degree kidnapping). The
Colorado Court of Appeals' statement of the facts is probably correct, in light of the fact
the Rex did not contend on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that Teeples questioned him
before advising him of his Miranda rights.
8. 753 F.2d at 842; see also People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
9. 753 F.2d at 842.
10. Id. The sexual assault charges were dismissed. Rex was initially convicted of the
kidnapping charge, but the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rex's state-
ments to Johnson and Teeples were involuntary and therefore inadmissable. People v.
Rex, 636 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Rex was then given a third trial in which
the involuntary statements were not introduced and he was again convicted of second
degree kidnapping. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed that conviction for reasons





1. The Mental Health Hold
A threshold requirement of a section 1983 claim is that there be a
deprivation of a constitutional right. 12 The plaintiff must allege that the
act was committed under color of state or local law and that it subjected
the plaintiff to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws."' 13 There is no simple test for de-
termining when a police officer has crossed the constitutional line and
violated another's constitutional right. For example, if an officer has
made a wrongful arrest with a warrant and with probable cause, courts
have generally found that there has been no constitutional deprivation 14
unless the arrest was made maliciously' 5 or for an improper purpose. '
6
Also, no constitutional deprivation has been found when only the
"slightest interference" with a personal liberty has been committed.' 7
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour writing for the majority, adapted
the "improper purpose" rationale previously used to assess arrests
made by police officers, to the facts surrounding the seventy-two hour
mental health hold.' 8 The court noted that if Teeples had placed Rex
under the mental health hold without the probable cause required by
the state mental health statute,19 for the improper purpose of question-
ing him about the kidnapping, Rex would have suffered a denial of his
liberty without due process sufficient to support his section 1983 claim.
The propriety of the mental health hold had not been addressed by the
11. 753 F.2d at 842-44.
12. See, e.g., McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1984). The rights
protected by section 1983 include all the rights protected by the fourteenth amendment,
such as those rights which are protected by the due process, privileges and immunities,
and equal protection clauses thereof. Annot., I A.L.R. Fed. 519, 524 (1969).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See supra note 1.
14. E.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (The Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff, falsely held by the police, had only a cause of action under state tort law, not
section 1983, because the police arrested the plaintiff with probable cause and under a
valid arrest warrant. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "The Fourteenth Amendment
does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations of
liberty accomplished without due process of law."); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485 (10th
Cir. 1977).
15. E.g., Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979) (stroke victim ar-
rested and put in drunk tank).
16. Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 609-11 (10th Cir. 1979) (woman arrested
for non-payment of traffic tickets, brought to police station and forced to meet with bank
employee about her non-payment of a loan); see also Sartin v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 430,
434 (8th Cir. 1976) (black man married to a white woman arrested without probable cause
by police for drunken driving).
17. Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 489 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Wise v. Bravo, 666
F.2d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. 753 F.2d at 843.
19. See supra note 6. The Tenth Circuit considered the mental health hold a possible
deprivation of the right to liberty without due process, under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, instead of a violation of the fourth amendment right to be free from illegal
arrests without probable cause or a warrant. Therefore, the "probable cause" of which the
court speaks is the probable cause under the Colorado mental health statute that a person
will be a danger to himself or others, rather than the probable cause necessary for a valid
arrest.
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district court and there were no affidavits from either the doctor or
Teeples explaining why Rex was held. Hence, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that there were definite issues of fact making summary judgment on this
issue inappropriate.
2 0
2. The Allegedly Involuntary Confession
The court likewise concluded that Rex had stated a constitutional
claim arising from the interrogation conducted by Teeples and Johnson
and reversed the summary judgment for the defendants on this issue.
2 1
The court ruled that the transcript of the taped interrogation and the
Colorado Court of Appeals' ruling, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, indicated that there was a factual issue regard-
ing whether Rex's statements had been made voluntarily. The court ob-
served that extracting an involuntary confession by psychological
coercion has been held to be a due process violation in other courts and
is, therefore, actionable under section 1983.22 Judge Barrett dissented,
arguing that although Officer Teeples may have participated in the in-
terrogation of Rex, those actions had not "caused" a deprivation of
Rex's constitutional rights. 23 He noted that Teeples had not introduced
the confession at Rex's trial, had not made the decision that it be intro-
duced, and had only taken the confession after being told that Rex had
been advised of his Miranda rights. Judge Barrett thus used the tradi-
tional tort analysis of proximate cause, whereby a defendant may be ex-
cused from liability if the actions of another defendant are an
intervening cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 24 In this case, the prosecu-
tor at Rex's kidnapping trial and the trial judge acted as intervening par-
ties to Teeples' liability, Judge Barrett claimed.
Tort law analysis is often used by courts in civil rights cases.
2 5
However, using the tort law analysis of proximate cause as a defense to a
20. 753 F.2d at 842-43. Judge Barrett dissented on this issue because he felt that it
was beyond dispute that Rex appeared dangerous to himself following his attempted sui-
cide, rendering Teeples' conduct within the authority created by the mental health statute.
Id. at 845 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
21. 753 F.2d at 843.
22. Id. (citing Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
894 (1972); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959)). It is interesting to note that
Rex could have asserted offensive collateral estoppel on the issue of whether his confes-
sion was involuntary. The Supreme Court has held, in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980), that decisions of state courts on federal constitutional claims raised in state crimi-
nal proceedings may be asserted as collateral estoppel in section 1983 actions. Collateral
estoppel would have prevented relitigation of whether Teeples and Johnson extracted an
involuntary confession from Rex, thereby violating his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983).
23. 753 F.2d at 846 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
24. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 301 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1960) (the Supreme Court holding
that section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability"), overruled on
other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Duncan v, Nelson,
466 F.2d 939, 942-43 (7th Cir.) (proximate cause analysis used to determine defendant's
liability); cert. denied, 404 U.S. 894 (1972); Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662,
688 (E.D. Cal. 1983);Jackson v. Dillion, 518 F. Supp. 618. 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See gener-
ally S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 83-86 (1979).
[Vol. 63:2
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constitutional violation does not follow the spirit, or the letter, of sec-
tion 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil action to protect persons
against misuse of state power; 26 it is often used where there is no ade-
quate state remedy. 2 7 Section 1983 is intended to provide a remedy for
violations of constitutional rights, those rights which are accorded the
highest value in our society. On the other hand, proximate cause analy-
sis is derived from traditional tort law which protects rights of a presum-
ably lower value. A state may, by statute, abolish recovery for tort
injuries but may not do the same to recovery for violation of constitu-
tional rights. One who wrongfully sets in motion the violation of an
individual's constitutional rights should bear a higher degree of respon-
sibility than that person should if a tort, not cognizable under the civil
rights laws, is ultimately committed against an individual. Proximate
cause analysis serves to equate the responsibility that one bears for caus-
ing a violation of a constitutional right with causing a tort. Therefore,
proximate cause analysis can, under some circumstances, serve to cut off
liability earlier than is appropriate given the status of constitutional
rights in our society.28 Furthermore, a proximate cause analysis cannot
be justified as a way to prevent police officers from bearing the brunt of
liability because of prosecutors' and judges' absolute immunity from
suit;29 police officers, too, can assert a qualified immunity to protect
themselves from this liability.
3 0
3. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
The Tenth Circuit's decision that Rex had asserted a colorable sec-
tion 1983 claim meant that it then had to decide if District Attorney
Johnson was absolutely immune from the claim. 3 1 The court held that
Johnson was not entitled to absolute immunity because his acts against
Rex were not part of "initiation and presentation of a prosecution,"
which is the Supreme Court standard set forth in Imbler v. Pachtman.3
2
In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a state prosecuting attorney
acting within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal
26. C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 51, at 94 (1980).
27. See Annot., I A.L.R. Fed. 519, 522 (1969).
28. One commentator writes: "[T]hat law school favorite, proximate cause, occasion-
ally appears to divert attention from the real issue, the existence of Section 1983 liability."
S. NAHMOD, supra note 25. The author analyzes use of the proximate cause analysis in
section 1983 actions, concluding that proximate cause standards from tort law should not
determine the extent of liability under section 1983, but instead, the extent of liability
should be solely a question of the scope of the constitutional breach. Id. at 83-86.
29. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1981) (police officer not liable
after district attorney files charges because prosecutor presumably exercises independent
judgment in determining if probable cause existed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
30. Absolute and qualified immunities are discussed infra, notes 43-48 and accompa-
nying text.
31. Rex, 753 F.2d at 843.
32. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See also Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1983).
Absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.3. This is as
opposed to a qualified immunity, which only protects public officials from liability when
they have acted in good faith. Qualified immunity is discussed infra, notes 43-48 and ac-
companying text.
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prosecution is immune from a civil suit for damages under section
1983. 3 3 Imbler provides only this narrow holding, however, and gives no
guidance as to which of the many functions of a prosecuting attorney are
covered by absolute immunity. Lower courts have since held that a
prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he engages in in-
vestigatory or administrative functions outside his "quasi-judicial"
role.3 4 The courts have held that police-related functions are investiga-
tive and so are not protected by absolute immunity.
35
The Tenth Circuit noted that "advocacy" is the determinative factor
in deciding which of the prosecutor's functions are covered by absolute
immunity, because it is a prosecutor's most "quasi-judicial" function.
s 6
The court concluded the District Attorney Johnson was not entitled to
absolute immunity because "giving Miranda warnings to a general sus-
pect and participating in his interrogation is 'police-related' work and
[not] quasi-judicial."'3 7 The court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for Johnson.
Judge Barrett, in dissent, argued that investigative and administra-
tive functions pervade a prosecutor's duties and that "slicing," or divid-
ing the functions into categories for determining entitlement to absolute
immunity is questionable.3 8 Judge Barrett characterized Johnson's in-
terrogation of Rex as being part of an advocate's preparation before de-
ciding whether to initiate an action.
3 9
B. Qualified Immunity: Bledsoe v. Garcia
In Bledsoe v. Garcia,40 the Tenth Circuit considered the qualified im-
munity defense asserted by a police officer. The court joined those
courts which have held that police officers may claim a qualified immu-




Qualified immunity, also known as the good faith defense, protects
33. 424 U.S. at 410, 431.
34. Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1982); McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 697 F.2d 309, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 503-05
(5th Cir. 1980). This is called the "functional approach" to the immunity question, See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1981); Taylor v. Kavanaugh, 640 F.2d 450,
452 (2d Cir. 1981). Courts examine the function rather than the status of the person
acting to determine if absolute immunity applies. Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1593 (1984); Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1983);
McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Note, Civil Rights, 5 Am. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 357 (1981).
35. Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir 1980); Apton v. Wilson, 506
F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
36. 753 F.2d at 843.
37. Id. at 844.
38. Id. at 845 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 845-46.
40. 742 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1984).
41. Id. at 1240.
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a public official from liability if he can prove he acted in "good faith." '4 2
Section 1983 does not expressly establish qualified or absolute immuni-
ties under that section.4 3 However, the Supreme Court in Pierson v.
Ray4 4 found that Congress did not intend to abolish all common law
immunities when it passed section 1983 and held that the good faith
defense available to police officers in common law false arrest and im-
prisonment actions is also available in a section 1983 false arrest and
imprisonment action. 45 The Court explained in a later case, Imbler v.
Pachtman,4 6 that it found this immunity to exist by first considering "the
immunity historically accorded the official at common law and the inter-
ests behind it," 4 7 and then by determining "whether the same consider-
ations of public policy that underlie the common law rule likewise
countenance . . . immunity under § 1983."48
There is some question among the courts as to whether a police
officer can also assert a qualified immunity to a section 1983 claim of
excessive force in making an arrest. 49 To find an immunity, lower courts
have extended the Supreme Court's holding in Pierson to this arrest situ-
42. Qualified immunity originally entailed both subjective and objective elements.
The subjective test has been eliminated. Today, officials are not subject to liability under
section 1983 if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1981). See generally Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Civil Rights, 62
DEN. U. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1985) (discussing the distinction between the subjective and
objective tests, as applied by the Tenth Circuit).
The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in good
faith. S. NAHMOD, supra note 25, at § 8.01.
43. One commentator has even suggested that section 1983 "could be read to impose
strict liability on state and local government officials once a constitutional deprivation has
been established." Note, Developments In the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1209 (1977). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1975) (Section
1983 "on its face admits of no immunities.").
44. 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1966). See also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(establishing immunity of legislators from section 1983 liability).
45. 386 U.S. at 557. The Court also held that judges have absolute immunity from
section 1983 liability. Id. at 553.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Pierson was highly critical of the absolute judicial immunity
holding. He did not discuss the qualified immunity issue, but his clear rejection of abso-
lute immunity seems to imply a concurrent rejection of qualified immunity. See also C.
ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs § 98 (2d ed. 1980) ("There is no acceptable proof
that Congress intended to immunize any public servants from liability under § 1983. It is
more likely that Congress intended in § 1983 to do away with whatever immunities existed
under state laws . . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, some courts-including the
Supreme Court-seem bound to rewrite the Civii Rights Acts so as to exempt certain pub-
lic servants from the law.").
46. 424 U.S. 409 (1975) (finding absolute immunity for prosecutors).
47. Id. at 421.
48. Id. at 424. The common law the Court refered to is not the common law of any
given state, but rather, as the Court stated in Pierson, "the prevailing view of common law
in this country." 386 U.S. at 555. See Note, Developments In the Law-§ 1983 and Federalism.
90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1211 n.126 (1977).
49. Excessive force has been defined as that force which is unreasonable and unneces-
sary under the circumstances and which violates universally accepted standards of de-
cency. Hausman v. Tredinnick, 432 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Federal courts
have held that a police officer's use of excessive force is actionable under section 1983. See
Hausman v. Tredinnick, 432 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Everett v. City of Chester, 391
F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
1986]
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ation. 50 Thus, the Eighth Circuit, in Landrum v. Moats,5 1 held that two
police officers who shot a burglary suspect in the back and killed him
used excessive force, but nevertheless were entitled to a "qualified im-
munity from liability based on [their] good faith belief in the propriety
of their actions and reasonable grounds for that belief."' 52 The court
then set out guidelines for determining good faith:
If police officers 1) believe that a certain amount of force is nec-
essary to make an arrest, 2) believe that use of that amount of
force is lawful under the circumstances, and 3) have reasonable
grounds for each of the foregoing beliefs, then they are entitled
to the defense of good faith even if the use of force turns out, ex
post, to have been illegal or excessive.
53
The court concluded that the absence of a good faith defense at com-
mon law to charges of assault and battery was not decisive on the availa-
bility of a section 1983 defense to such charges in view of "the policies
and purposes of the section 1983 action."
54
Two federal district courts, however, have held that police officers
are not entitled to this good faith defense. One district court, in a deci-
sion affirmed per curium by the Sixth Circuit, 55 held that there is no good
faith defense to the use of excessive force when the cause of action is
based upon assault and battery. The court reached this decision by in-
terpreting the immunity found in Pierson as applying only to actions for
false imprisonment and false arrest. 56 Another district court, in a case
involving a deputy sheriffs violence towards a jail inmate, held that
the good faith defense is not applicable to an excessive force claim be-
cause such force violates constitutional rights and is inherently
unreasonable.
57
2. Bledsoe v. Garcia
Defendant Garcia, a police officer, came to the Bledsoe residence to
arrest Plaintiff, Betty Bledsoe's son, Larry, for failure to appear and to
50. Samuel v. Busnuck, 423 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Md. 1976) (Police have a good faith
defense to liability under a section 1983 action for excessive force, even though that force
was used to effect an "improvident and misguided arrest.") (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at
557); Richardson v. Snow, 340 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Md. 1972) (defense available to charge of
excessive force used to effect an arrest without a warrant) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557).
51. 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
52. Id. at 1327.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1327-28, n.15.
55. Aldridge v. Mullins, 377 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), afdper curiam, 474 F.2d
1189 (6th Cir. 1973).
56. 377 F. Supp. at 858-59. In Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.
1979), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court finding that the defendant police officers
could assert a good faith defense because they had acted in good faith reliance upon a
state law allowing police officers to kill a fleeing felon. The court did not specifically over-
rule Aldridge, so presumably the Sixth Circuit continues not to recognize the good faith
defense when the claim against the police is for assault and battery.
57. Williams v. Thomas, 511 F. Supp. 535, 542 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("The Court . . .
cannot acquiesce in the proposition that excessive force can be immunized from liability
merely by a detention officer's sincere conviction that such excessive force represents the
best response to a perceived problem of prison discipline.").
(Vol. 63:2
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investigate Larry's AWOL status. 58 Larry stepped outside the house to
talk to Officer Garcia and admitted that he was AWOL. He then asked
Garcia if he could tell his mother that he was going to jail. 59 Garcia,
upon hearing someone in the house tell Larry that he was "not going
anywhere with that son-of-a-bitch," asked two other officers to assist
him. When the police officers walked toward the house, Betty Bledsoe
blocked the door and told them they could not enter.60 Garcia arrested
her for interfering with the police.
6 1
Betty Bledsoe brought a section 1983 action against Officer Garcia,
claiming that Garcia had used excessive force in arresting her.6 2 The
jury found for Garcia. 63 Bledsoe appealed, contending that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that good faith is a defense to a sec-
tion 1983 claim of excessive force.
64 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
65
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, first pointed to the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Landrum that good faith is a defense to a sec-
tion 1983 action based on excessive force, 66 setting out Landrum's four-
part guideline for determining good faith. 6 7 Then, applying the
Supreme Court's criteria set forth in Imbler, the court examined the com-
mon law immunity accorded police officers making arrests, the interests
served by this immunity, and whether such an immunity would be con-
sistent with section 1983's policies and history.68 To do this, the Tenth
Circuit chose to look at the common law of arrest instead of assault and
battery. Bledsoe had argued that common law assault and battery was
applicable, 69 and to which there is no good faith defense. 70 The court
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which establishes a privi-
lege to use force in making an arrest as long as the force is not in excess
of that which "the actor reasonably believes to be necessary." 7 1 Noting
that the underlying policy of the privilege was that police should not be
held liable for split-second decisions made when arresting possibly dan-
gerous persons, the court held that the common law privilege of force
"provides a sufficient parallel for recognizing in a § 1983 suit a good
58. Bledsoe v. Garcia, 742 F.2d 1237, 1238.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Once inside the house, Garcia arrested a neighbor, Gail Wesson, for interfer-
ing with the duties of a police officer when she tried to prevent the officers from searching
the rooms. Id.
62. Id. at 1239. Gail Wesson joined Betty Bledsoe in her suit, claiming that Garcia
and another officer falsely arrested and imprisoned her. Wessonjoined Bledsoe in several
other claims. Those claims asserted by Wesson alone were denied by the court. Id. at
1242-43 (refuting plaintiffs' claims of erroneous jury instructions).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1240.
66. Id. at 1239.
67. Id. See supra text accompanying note 53.
68. 742 F.2d at 1239 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976)).
69. Id. at 1239.
70. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21-34 (1965).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 118, 132 (1965).
19861
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
faith defense to a claim of excessive force in making an arrest." 7 2
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Bledsoe extends the common law
good faith defense to a section 1983 action based on excessive force.
The holding seems a logical and natural one, based as it is on the solid
ground of common law and the Supreme Court's and other circuits'
findings of a qualified immunity for police officers. However, the hold-
ing's implications deserve closer examination.
Officers using excessive force, particularly deadly force, potentially
act as " 'prosecutor, jury, judge and executioner,' -73 clearly in violation
of one's due process rights. 74 Excessive force also violates the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. 75 Because
excessive force is always a violation of constitutional rights and is, by
definition, unreasonable and unnecessary, should a police officer escape
liability merely by asserting that he acted in good faith? If he can assert
this defense, then section 1983's unique purpose and effect are diluted.
Balanced against the above argument is the public's interest in not
preventing its police officers from taking action because of fear of liabil-
ity. Perhaps a middle ground can be reached by allowing police officers
only to use force proportionate to the crime for which the arrest is being
made. Thus, police officers would then be able to assert the good faith
defense only when they used excessive force in arresting a violent
felon. 76 This is an imperfect solution, however, because line-drawing
then begins between violent and non-violent felons and between felons
and misdemeanants, and everything has come full circle: should the po-
lice, when arresting someone, be liable under section 1983 for a split-
second decision, or should there be a qualified immunity for police of-
ficers in this situation? The debate will continue.
C. Prisoners' Rights: Access To The Courts
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided two cases on
prisoners' right of access to the courts. Ward v. Kort 7 7 is a case of first
impression in which the court held that forensic patients have a right of
access to the courts, and state provisions of legal assistance in lieu of a
law library requires counseling for prisoners through completion of a
habeas corpus or civil rights complaint. Nordgren v. Milliken,7 8 a case de-
cided concurrently with Ward, indicates the extent to which the Tenth
Circuit is willing to find a right of access to the courts. The court there
72. 742 F.2d at 1240.
73. Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review. 11 HARV. Civ. RTS.
L. REv. 361, 386 (1976) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945)).
74. Aldridge v. Mullins, 377 F. Supp. 850, 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), affid, 474 F.2d
1189 (6th Cir. 1973); C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Ac-rs § 131 (2d ed. 1980).
75. See generally Comment, supra note 73, at 384.
76. Comment, supra note 73, at 373 (1976).
77. 762 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985).
78. 762 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).
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held that the right of access does not require assistance beyond the ini-
tial pleading stage.
1. The Right of Access to the Courts
The right of access to the courts is protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 7 9 and "assures that no
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allega-
tions concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."8 0
The Supreme Court has found that prisoners have a constitutional right
of access to the courts8 ' to bring habeas corpus and civil rights ac-
tions. 82 In Bounds v. Smith,83 the Court further held that states must pro-
vide prisoners with adequate law libraries or legal assistance to assure
this access.
84
In Bounds, the Court found that access must be adequate, effective
and meaningful. 8 5 The Court emphasized that the right of access pro-
tects "our most valued rights" because it allows prisoners to file habeas
corpus and civil rights petitions. 86 To ensure that courts consider such
petitions, the Court held that states must provide prisoners with a law
library or legal assistance to research issues of venue, standing, exhaus-
tion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and types of
relief.8 7 With current legal information, prisoners might determine
"whether a colorable claim exists and what facts are necessary to state a
cause of action." 8 8
2. Ward v. Kort
8 9
The plaintiff, Ray Ward, was an indigent forensic patient at Colo-
79. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1973). The right of access to the courts
has also been found to be one of the privileges and immunities accorded citizens under
article four and the fourteenth amendment, and as part of the right to petition under the
first amendment. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983). It has also been
found to be covered by the equal protection clause. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105,
109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The Tenth Circuit does not agree that it can be found under the
equal protection clause. See, e.g., Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 855 n.3 (10th Cir.
1985).
80. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579.
81. Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
82. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579-80.
83. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
84. Id. at 828.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 827. Both federal and state prisoners can petition for writs of habeas corpus
to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982).
State prisoners can challenge the conditions of their confinement by filing a section 1983
civil rights action and alleging that prison officials, acting under color of state law, have
deprived the prisoner of constitutional or federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
87. 430 U.S. at 825-26.
88. Id.
89. The author would like to express her gratitude to Professor Alfred J. Coco,
Professor of Law and Librarianship and Law Librarian at the University of Denver College
of Law. Professor Coco represented Plaintiff Ray Ward on appeal and provided the author
with background information pertaining to this case.
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rado State Hospital (CSH). 90 In 1980, he initiated a section 1983 civil
rights action, pro se, challenging the conditions of his confinement at
CSH. Ward claimed that the CSH superintendent failed to provide ade-
quate access to legal materials, thereby denying him adequate access to
the courts. 9 ' CSH had no law library, the only legal books available be-
ing one set of the Colorado Revised Statutes kept in the administration
building. 92 The hospital instead had a contract for legal services with a
private attorney to provide twelve hours of counselling a week for the
patients. 9 3 The magistrate who heard the case found and stated in his
findings of fact that the attorney assisted the patients in obtaining the
necessary forms from the United States District Court for civil rights and
habeas corpus petitions, helped in drafting the pleadings, and provided
research of case law as required. 94 The magistrate recommended dis-
missal of the case and the district judge affirmed and adopted the magis-
trate's findings and conclusions and dismissed the action.9 5 Ward
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Holloway writing for the majority,
considered two issues: 1) whether a prisoner's constitutional right of
access to the courts, defined by the Supreme Court in Bounds, applied to
forensic patients at a state hospital; and 2) if so, whether CSH's con-
tracted legal services met Bounds' constitutional test of meaningful
access .96
To resolve the first issue, the court relied on a Seventh Circuit case,
Johnson by Johnson v. Brelje,9 7 that is directly on point. That court held
that defendants under criminal charges who are committed to a mental
facility because they are found unfit to stand trial have a constitutional
right of access to the courts. 9 8 The Tenth Circuit agreed with theJohn-
son by Johnson court that forensic patients are not on a "lower plane"
than prisoners and held that they, too, are entitled to a constitutional
right of access to the courts.9 9 The Tenth Circuit then considered
whether CSH had afforded adequate access to the courts for its patients.
After reviewing the record, the Tenth Circuit held that the legal
services at CSH were constitutionally infirm because the contract attor-
ney was not knowledgeable about civil rights law, did not prepare
habeas corpus and civil right complaints for the patients or give them
guidance in completing these complaints, and did not research any is-
sues such as those set forth in Bounds: " 'jurisdiction, venue, standing,
exhaustion of remedies, proper parties plaintiff and defendant, and
90. 762 F.2d 856, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1985). Ward had been confined to CSH since






96. Id. at 858.
97. 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 1207.
99. Ward, 762 F.2d at 858.
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types of relief available.' "100 Instead, he merely advised patients that
they could get forms from the federal district court for civil rights ac-
tions, and so, the court found, did not provide adequate legal coun-
sel.' 0 ' The court concluded that the magistrate's findings, which were
subsequently adopted by the district court, that the contract attorney
adequately assisted hospital inmates through the completion of federal
habeas corpus or civil rights complaints, were not supported by substan-
tial evidence and were clearly erroneous.'
0 2
Using the Bounds "touchstone" of adequate, effective, and meaning-
ful access,' 0 3 the Tenth Circuit then held that if a state elects to employ
contract attorneys rather than provide an adequate law library, the attor-
neys must counsel the prisoners or forensic patients through the com-
pletion of a federal habeas corpus or civil rights complaint, including
"necessary research and consideration of the facts and the law."' 10 4
Dissenting, Judge Barrett argued that the CSH legal services con-
tract satisfied Bounds because inmates need only minimal assistance to
file habeas corpus or civil rights forms 10 5 and have no more right to an
attorney who is an expert in civil rights than does anyone else. 10 6 Any
other interpretation of Bounds, he wrote, would mean a requirement of
"legal representation" in civil litigation. 10 7 Judge Barrett further
pointed out the expense entailed in providing law libraries and legal
services not only to prisons but also to mental hospitals treating forensic
patients.10 8 Finally, Judge Barrett argued that prisoners must expect to
live under restrictive and harsh conditions as part of their penalty.' 0 9
Ward, even more than Bounds, affirms the states' obligation to assure
all prisoners of their constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds
requires states to assist prisoners in the filing of habeas corpus and civil
rights petitions. Ward clarifies this by requiring assistance through the
completion of the complaint. Furthermore, Ward extends this right of
access to forensic patients in mental hospitals.
The Tenth Circuit did not hold, however, that prisoners and foren-
sic patients have a right to representation by counsel in habeas corpus or
civil rights trial proceedings.' 10 Nevertheless, the court made it clear
100. Id. at 860 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825).
101. 762 F.2d at 859-61.
102. Id. at 860.
103. " 'Meaningful access' to the courts is the touchstone." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823.
104. 762 F.2d at 860-61.
105. Id. at 861 (Barrett. J. dissenting). This argument is belied by an earlier Tenth
Circuit case, Bradenburg v. Beaman, 632 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
984 (1981). The court there held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to entertain
a prisoner's habeas corpus and civil rights complaint when the prisoner failed to show
evidence of exhaustion of state remedies and used the wrong jurisdictional basis. Id. at
122. See also Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979) (concluding that pro se plaintiffs have very little chance
of succeeding in section 1983 actions).
106. 762 F.2d at 861 (Barrett, J. dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 862 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
110. Ward, 762 F.2d at 860.
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that providing prisoners access to the courts must be more than a sym-
bolic gesture; prisoners and forensic patients must be able to file cor-
rect, complete petitions so that a prisoner with a valid complaint can
bring it to the courts and not be in danger of losing the protection of
"our most valued rights.'''''
Are states, however, required to assist prisoners in the filing of all
civil actions? Furthermore, are states required to give any legal assist-
ance to prisoners beyond the initial pleading stage? Another case de-
cided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey period, Nordgren v.
Milliken,"12 addressed these questions and the Tenth Circuit answered
both in the negative.
3. Nordgren v. Milliken
In Nordgren, the plaintiffs, indigent prisoners at the Utah State
Prison, brought a section 1983 action claiming that they were denied
access to the courts because of an allegedly inadequate prison law li-
brary and inadequate legal assistance. 13 The underlying causes of ac-
tion for which the plaintiffs were alleging a denial of access included
defense of a paternity suit, modification of a divorce decree, an action
for unlawful conversion of a plaintiffs guns, and civil rights claims
against the prison staff.' 14 The magistrate in his report found that the
state provided only minimal law library facilities at the prison but had
provided services of contracted attorneys who helped prisoners prepare
and file initial pro se pleadings in all civil matters. 115 Therefore, the mag-
istrate concluded, because there is no constitutional right to the assist-
ance of counsel for prison inmates beyond the pleading stage, the prison
had provided constitutionally adequate services.l 16 The district court
adopted the magistrate's report and granted summary judgment for the
defendant prison officials. 17
On appeal, the prisoners contended that meaningful access to the
courts includes the provision of legal assistance at all stages of trial pro-
ceedings, not just the initial pleading stage, and for all types of civil
cases, not just habeas corpus and civil rights cases.' 18
Surveying Supreme Court and appellate court holdings, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the right of access to the courts does not require
assistance to inmates beyond the completion of a habeas corpus or civil
111. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
112. 762 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 851-52.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 852 & n.2.
116. Id. at 852.
117. Id. at 852-53.
118. Id. at 853. The prisoners also contended that the prison must provide legal assist-
ance without the prison officials' prior determination that the inmates have meritorious
claims. The Tenth Circuit found that the attorneys were only determining which com-
plaints were appropriate for court-appointed counsel or private counsel, and that this did
not infringe upon the right of access to the courts. Id. at 855 n.4.
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rights complaint.' 19 The court noted that Utah had already made a sub-
stantial effort to assist inmates by providing a library and legal assistance
and explained that it could not require more assistance of the state be-
cause of the burden that would be imposed.
120
In a footnote, the court determined that the prisoners' second con-
tention - that a law library or legal assistance must be available for all
kinds of civil cases - had no factual basis because the state's contract
with the law firm provided for legal assistance in all civil matters, not
merely federal habeas corpus or civil rights actions. 12 1 However, the
court then reiterated its holding in Ward that prisoners are only entitled
to legal assistance through the completion of habeas corpus or civil
rights complaints, ' 2 2 which seems to suggest that the state's legal serv-
ices contract provided assistance beyond that which is constitutionally
required.
4. Analysis
In Ward, the Tenth Circuit held that prisoners must be assured of
adequate aid in filing habeas corpus and civil rights actions in order that
their rights be protected. Although Judge Barrett's dissenting argument
in Ward - that prisoners have no more right than anyone else to an
attorney expert in civil rights - misses the majority's point, it is well
taken as applied to the facts of Nordgren. In Nordgren, the plaintiffs
wanted legal assistance in filing divorce and paternity actions. The
Tenth Circuit apparently agreed with Judge Barrett's argument in Ward
and held that prisoners do not have a right to legal assistance in all civil
actions. 
12 3
The court broke no new ground in addressing Nordgren's second
issue. The prisoners had argued that legal assistance only through the
filing of initial pleadings did not afford adequate access to the courts.
Stating as much in Bounds, the Supreme Court said:
[I]f the State files a response to a pro se pleading, it will un-
doubtedly contain seemingly authoritative citations. Without a
library, an inmate will be unable to rebut the State's argument.
It is not enough to answer that the court will evaluate the facts
pleaded in light of the relevant law. Even the most dedicated
trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without
the benefit of an adversary presentation.
124
Of course, the Court was referring to the filing of initial pleadings, but
the State may make motions throughout habeas corpus or civil rights
proceedings, and without a law library or legal assistance, a prisoner
cannot effectively make "an adversary presentation." However, the
Tenth Circuit balanced the prisoners' interests against a state's burden
119. Id. at 853-55.
120. Id. at 855.
121. Id, at 855 n.4.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 855 n.4 (dictum).
124. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826.
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in providing more legal assistance and concluded that the right of access
did not include assistance beyond the initial pleading stage. Thus, it
remains to be seen what future courts will hold is necessary to guarantee
access and where they will next draw the line.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN AN ACADEMIC SETTING UNDER
TITLE VII: CARLILE . SOUTH RouTT SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. Background
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in employment
on the basis of sex.125 The courts have developed two theories of Title
VII liability: disparate impact and disparate treatment. A disparate im-
pact claim is appropriate when an employment practice discriminates
against all members of a protected class. 12 6 A disparate treatment
claim, on the other hand, lies when the employer has intentionally dis-
criminated against a particular member of a protected class.
12 7
In the leading Title VII disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. V Green, 128 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must initially
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
i) that he belongs to a racial minority; ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking ap-
plicants; iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the
complainant's qualifications. 1
2 9
Once this four-prong test is met, the burden shifts to the employer to
"articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."' 3 0 If the employer does give a satisfactory reason,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's legiti-
mate and non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination. 13'
125. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). Section 2000e-2(a)(l) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to remove secular educational facilities from
Title VII's original exemption. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1972)).
126. Cohen, Sex Discrimination in Academic Employment: Judicial Deference and a Stricter Stan-
dard, 36 LAB. L.J. 67, 68 (1985). Protected classes under Title VII are distinguished by
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
127. Cohen, supra note 126, at 68.
128. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
129. Id. at 802.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 804. In a later case, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), in which the Supreme Court clarified the McDonnell Douglas allocation of
burdens and presentation of proof, the Court stated that a plaintiff shows pretext "either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explaination is unworthy
of credence." Id. at 256.
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Courts have adapted the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test to differ-
ent fact situations. 132 In Smith v. University of North Carolina, '3 3 a female
assistant professor of religion at the university raised a Title VII claim
that the university had discriminatorily refused to reappoint or promote
her. 1 34 The Fourth Circuit found it necessary to adapt the McDonnell
Douglas test to a university setting. The Smith prima facie test of discrim-
ination requires:
1) That the plaintiff belonged to a disadvantaged class or to a
racial or religious minority; 2) That the plaintiff sought and was
qualified for reappointment or promotion; 3) That the plaintiff
was not reappointed or promoted; and 4) That, in the case of
reappointment, the college sought applicants to fill the position
from persons of plaintiffs qualifications; or in the case of pro-
motion, the employer had promoted other persons possessing
similar qualifications at approximately the same time.' 3 5
The Ninth Circuit, in Lynn v. Regents of the University of California,13 6 has
adopted the Fourth Circuit's adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie test.
B. Carlile v. South Routt School District
This survey term, the Tenth Circuit also established a prima facie
test for employment discrimination in an academic setting. The case,
Carlile v. South Routt School District,137 involved a Title VII claim of sex
discrimination based upon refusal of a school board to renew the em-
ployment contract of a female high school teacher, Nettie Carlile, and
grant her tenure. The facts of Carlile are significantly distinguishable
from other academic discrimination cases. The Tenth Circuit chose to
ignore this, however, thus making its decision of questionable value to
future courts deciding similar cases.
Carlile taught English and history at a public high school in rural
Colorado.' 3 8 After consistently receiving good and excellent evalua-
tions from the principal for two and one-half years of teaching, Carlile
suddenly received a poor teaching evaluation from an acting principal,
who also recommended to the district that her contract not be renewed
for a fourth year.139 There had been rumors during the period in which
132. See A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.22 (1985). In a
footnote in McDonnell Douglas. the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations,"
thereby allowing courts to adapt the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test as they find neces-
sary. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
133. 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980).
134. Id. at 321.
135. Id. at 340.
136. 656 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
137. 739 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1498.
139. Under Colorado state law, a teacher employed for the fourth successive year auto-
matically receives tenure, so the non-renewal of Carlile's contract was the equivalent of a
denial of tenure. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-112 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
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Carlile received her negative review that the head coach of the boys'
basketball team was intending to resign. The coach did resign one
month after the district formally denied renewal of Carlile's contract.
140
The school district then hired a male teacher to teach history and coach
the boys' basketball team.14 ' Carlile then brought an employment dis-
crimination action against the school district, claiming that the district's
failure to renew her contract and grant her tenure was based on gender,
in violation of Title VII.
14 2
The trial court applied the Lynn four-prong prima facie test, 14 3 and
determined that Carlile failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
natory motive underlying her termination. 144 The trial court found that
Carlile did not pass the second and fourth prongs of the test. She did
not meet the second prong, that of qualifying for the available position,
because the school district needed someone who could coach boys' bas-
ketball and teach, and she did not meet the fourth prong, the showing
that the school district had hired someone with the same qualifications,
because the district hired someone with different qualifications, includ-
ing the ability to coach boys' basketball.'
45
The Tenth Circuit, Judge McKay writing, agreed that the four-
prong prima facie test set out in Lynn and Smith was appropriate in any
academic setting, including local public schools as well as universi-
ties,' 46 and held that the trial court's application of that test had not
been clearly erroneous. 1 4 7 The court held that the non-renewal of Car-
lile's contract was tantamount to a denial of tenure. Therefore, the dis-
trict court was not clearly erroneous in applying the four-prong test,
originally designed to apply to a denial of tenure, to the school district's
decision not to renew Carlile's contract.
14 8
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Carlile joins other circuits in adapting the Mc-
Donnell Douglas prima facie test to the academic setting. However, the
court's treatment of Carlile as just another case of discrimination in an
academic setting provides no answers to the questions raised by the facts
of Carlile.
The Smith and Lynn prima facie tests were adapted for the situation
where a university professor's academic qualifications are evaluated for a
promotion, reappointment, or tenure. The situation in Carlile was very
different. The only similarity among the cases is that all three arose in
140. 739 F.2d at 1498.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit wrongly stated that the trial court applied the
Smith test. Id. at 1500. See Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1341.
144. Carlile, 739 F.2d at 1499.
145. Id. at 1501.
146. Id. at 1500.




an academic setting. Carlile, as the trial court found, 149 did not involve
denial of tenure based on lack of academic qualifications; rather, denial
was based on the lack of the suddenly-added qualification of coaching
boys' basketball. Carlile could never hope to meet this requirement.
This fact distinguishes Carlile from Smith, Lynn, and other academic dis-
crimination cases. 1 50 The Tenth Circuit does not shed light on the dis-
tinction, treating the situation as only a contract renewal and tenure
decision.
Perhaps the problem is not the test, but its application. At least one
court has determined that a sudden change in qualifications establishes
a prima facie case of discrimination. 15 1 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas found that plaintiffs "must be given a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the pre-
sumptively valid reasons for rejection were in fact a cover up for a ra-
cially discriminatory decision."' 15 2 McDonnell Douglas had refused to
rehire the plaintiff, citing his participation in demonstrations against the
company.' 5 3 While the Court found that the company's reasons for not
rehiring the plaintiff successfully rebutted the plaintiffs claim of discrim-
ination,' 5 4 it also found that the inquiry did not end there. The plaintiff
had to be given an opportunity to show that white employees commit-
ting equally serious and disruptive acts against the company were "nev-
ertheless retained or rehired."' 155 Likewise, the school district's reason
for discharging Carlile should merely have rebutted Carlile's prima facie
case of discrimination, not defeated her claim of qualification for the
job. Carlile should then have had an opportunity to demonstrate that
the combination of the teaching and coaching positions was a pretext, by
showing that in similar situations male teachers who could not also
coach were not discharged. This application of the test is necessary to
prevent employers from adding qualifications that not only discriminate
against employees but also destroy the employees' chances of establish-
ing a prima facie case to challenge this discrimination. This will be the
outcome if the courts have only Carlile to rely on when similar situations
arise in the future.
149. 739 F.2d at 1499.
150. But see Civil Rights Div. v. Amphitheater Unified School Dist., 680 P.2d 517 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983). Amphitheater is possibly the only other case with a fact situation similar to
Carlile's. It is a disparate impact case, however. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that
the school district's combining of a biology teaching position with a football coaching posi-
tion had a disparate impact on women.
151. Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 996-97 (6th Cir. 1984). In Geis/er, the plaintiff
applied for an engineering position and one week later the employer changed the educa-
tional requirement for the position. The Sixth Circuit held that this established a prima
facie case of discrimination.
152. 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
153. Id. at 796.
154. Id. at 804.
155. Id.
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III. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: EEOC v.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
A. Background
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 156 is the prin-
cipal source of law on age discrimination. Enacted in 1967, the ADEA
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against persons be-
tween the ages of forty and seventy because of their age. Administration
and enforcement of the act is entrusted to the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC).'
5 7
The only Tenth Circuit case during this survey period that involved
the ADEA was EEOC v. Prudential.'5 8 The EEOC claimed that Pruden-
tial Federal Savings had violated the ADEA by firing several employees.
At trial, the jury found that the termination of one employee violated the
act and accordingly awarded him both legal and equitable relief. Both
parties appealed to the Supreme Court; it vacated and remanded the
Tenth Circuit's original decision to be reconsidered in light of a 1985
Supreme Court decision, Trans World Airlines v. Thurston.159 The Tenth
Circuit's subsequent decision is notable because the court held for the
first time that future damages are available under the ADEA. The Tenth
Circuit also discussed the ADEA conciliation requirement and the ap-
propriate content ofjury instructions regarding the plaintiffs burden of
proof. Finally, the court adopted the standard set forth in Thurston for
determining whether or not an employer has willfully violated the
ADEA. 16
0
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision on Remand
1. Conciliation
When a private party files a charge with the EEOC, 16 1 or when the
EEOC itself institutes an action, the EEOC must "promptly notify all
persons named in such charge" and "seek to eliminate any alleged un-
lawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference and per-
suasion." 162 This conciliation requirement allows employers to comply
voluntarily with the Act before any formal action is filed. 16 3 Courts re-
gard the conciliation requirement as jurisdictional and may grant sum-
mary judgment to the employer if they deem the EEOC's conciliation
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1982).
158. 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985).
159. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985) (airline's violation of ADEA was not willful according to the
standard adopted by the Court).
160. Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1174-75.
161. The ADEA allows a private party to file a charge with the EEOC alleging unlawful
discrimination. The individual must then wait 60 days before bringing suit. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d) (1982). The party's right to bring a private action terminates if the EEOC com-
mences an action on behalf of the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982).
163. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974).
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efforts inadequate.164 However, many courts prefer to stay the proceed-
ings to allow the EEOC to comply fully with the conciliation
requirement.'
65
In Prudential, the defendant argued that the EEOC had not satisfied
its statutory duty to conciliate.' 6 6 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding
the the EEOC need only make a limited effort to conciliate to satisfy the
Act's minimal jurisdictional requirement. If the EEOC's initial effort is
not sufficient, the court held, then the district court can stay the pro-
ceedings to allow compliance instead of dismissing the action.' 6 7 Here,
the court concluded, the EEOC had sufficiently tried conciliation be-
cause it had told Prudential who the charging parties were, what specific
misconduct they alleged, and what remedies they sought. The EEOC
had also invited conciliation on several occasions.
16 8
2. The Instruction on Age as a Determinative Factor
In an ADEA action, the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated by the
plaintiff's age in discharging or not hiring the plaintiff.' 69 However,
plaintiffs cannot always find direct evidence of an employer's motivation
in making an employment decision. Under Title VII, as discussed ear-
lier, 170 the McDonnell Douglas formula allows an inference of discrimina-
tory motive through the use of objective facts when direct evidence is
not available. '
7 '
Courts also apply the McDonnell Douglas formula in ADEA cases but
disagree on how to apply it.172 As the First Circuit pointed out in Loeb v.
164. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 102.24(b) (1984) [here-
inafter cited as LARSON & LARSON]. See, e.g., Marshall v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 19 Fair
Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1400 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (summary judgment proper since concili-
ation efforts failed to satisfy jurisdictional requirements).
165. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 164, at § 102.24(b). See, e.g., Marshall v. Sun Oil
Co., 592 F.2d 563, 566 (10th Cir.) (The court held that when further conciliation efforts
are required for satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirement, it is proper to grant a stay of
proceedings. Summary judgment is inappropriate because it effectively denies access to
the courts.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
166. 763 F.2d at 1168-69. The court basically reaffirmed the principles set forth in Sun
Oil.
167. Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1169.
168. Id.
169. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979); 2 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 579 (1980).
170. See supra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
171. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The formula pro-
vides that the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
1) that he belongs to a minority; 2) that he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the
employer was seeking applicants; 3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. Id. The burden of proof then shifts to
the employer who is then allowed to offer legitimate reasons for the employee's rejection.
Id. If the employer's reasons for rejection rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff
is then given the opportunity to show that the employer's reasons for rejection were
merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
172. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp.. 696 F.2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (AlcDon-
nell Douglas does not provide exclusive criteria for establishing a prima facie case); Cuddy
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Textron,17 3 a leading ADEA case, several problems arise in applying the
McDonnell Douglas formula to ADEA cases. First, the employer's decision
to discharge an employee often results from mixed legal and discrimina-
tory motives. 17 4 The McDonnell Douglas formula does not address this
situation. 17 5 Second, under the ADEA, a plaintiff has an express right to
a jury trial. 17 6 Since the McDonnell Douglas formula was created for
judge-tried Title VII proceedings, adapting the formula to jury trials
may confuse the jurors when they attempt to interpret and apply the
formula. 177 Therefore, the First Circuit concluded, in the "mixed mo-
tive" situation, courts must instruct the jury that the plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that although several motives
may have precipitated his discharge, age was the determinative fac-
tor.178 This is now the predominant rule in the circuits.
179
Prudential apparently had mixed motives in discharging the plain-
tiff. Using language from McDonnell Douglas, Prudential had requested
the trial court to instruct the jury to find for Prudential unless the EEOC
proved that Prudential's other reasons for the discharge were merely a
pretext for discrimination. 180 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial
court's refusal to so instruct the jury on the grounds that such instruc-
tions would confuse the jury into thinking that age had to be the only
factor motivating Prudential's discharge.' 8 ' The Tenth Circuit then
v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court applied a test analogous to McDonnell
Douglas formula); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982)
(court prefers to decide ADEA claims using a case-by-case approach, rather than by adher-
ing to a mechanical application of the McDonnell Douglas formula); Jackson v. Sears, Roe-
buck and Co., 648 F.2d 225, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (court applies McDonnell Douglas
formula); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Sta-
nojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (A prima facie case is
established when the plaintiff proves he is qualified for the job and it is filled by someone
else. These two criteria are derived from the McDonnell Douglas formula.); Smith v. Univer-
sity of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 335 (4th Cir. 1980) (The McDonnell Douglas formula-
tion is applicable to ADEA cases, but the elements of a prima facie case need not be recited
in jury instructions.).
173. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 1019. This combination of legal and discriminatory motives is often re-
ferred to as "mixed motives." Id.
175. Id.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (right
to jury trial under ADEA).
177. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016-17; see also Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the
McDonnell Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1258
(1981) ("[T]he extensive McDonnell Douglas instruction focuses the jury's attention upon
prima facie elements, articulations, and proof of pretext, which loom in importance while
the judge speaks. As a result, the basic questions of age as a 'but for' factor may be
forgotten.").
178. 600 F.2d at 1019. The court also suggested that the judge should use the McDon-
nell Douglas formula to allocate the burden of proof and organize the evidence, but should
not read the formula to the jury. Id. at 1016.
179. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); Bunch v.
United States, 680 F.2d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
669 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); Geller v. Mark-
ham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Loeb v. Tex-
tron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1979).




held that an ADEA plaintiff need not show that age was the sole motivat-
ing factor in the employment decision as long as the plaintiff can prove
that the age factor made the difference.
18 2
3. Future Damages
The ADEA has a two-part remedial scheme. The first part incorpo-
rates the remedial provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 18
3
The FLSA provides for recovery of back pay' 8 4 and attorney fees ' 8 5 and
for recourse to injunctive relief.'8 6 The second part of the ADEA's re-
medial scheme includes the power to grant whatever relief is necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.' 8 7 The first part plainly states that
the remedies available to ADEA plaintiffs are those given under FLSA,
but the second part provides for unlimited legal or equitable relief. Be-
cause of this discrepancy, courts interpreting this section of the ADEA
conflict on whether it allows the award of future damages, or "front
pay."1
8 8
In this same section, the ADEA expressly permits reinstatement as a
remedy. 189 All circuits now hold that front pay is available when rein-
statement is not possible. °9 0 Some of these circuits have modified the
front pay remedy by holding that front pay is available only when the
plaintiff has requested reinstatement, 191 whereas other circuits hold that
a plaintiff does not waive his right to front pay if he does not request
reinstatement. '
9 2
In Prudential, the Tenth Circuit held for the first time that front pay
182. Id. The court relied on an earlier decision. Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726
F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1984), which held that the standard of proof necessarily requires
the jury to focus on the effect of the plaintiffs age.
183. 29 U.S.C § 201-19 (1982). The ADEA incorporates sections 211 (b), 216 (b)-(e)
and 217 of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The ADEA further provides that its
"provisions . . . shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and proce-
dures provided in sections . . . of this title." Id.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). Back pay equals the difference between salary together
with specific monetary benefits which would have vested prior to trial and the value of
benefits and earnings from other jobs from discharge to the trial date. Monroe v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). "In any action brought to enforce this chapter the
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate
m . . including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion." Id.
188. Front pay is "payment for wages that would have been earned subsequent to trial
but for the alleged discrimination." LARSON & LARSON, supra note 164, at § 103.44.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
190. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985); Maxfield v. Sinclair
Int'l, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. 748 F.2d
1543, 1551 (11 th Cir. 1984); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d
Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated
Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
191. Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 48, 50 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Monroe
v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
192. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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is an available remedy under the ADEA. It found that the ADEA's grant
of power to award "legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of [the Act]" is "a significant addition"l 9 3 to the
remedies available under FLSA, necessary to effect the Act's purpose by
compensating a wronged employee and deterring other unlawful dis-
crimination. 19 4 The court found that although reinstatement is the pre-
ferred remedy under the ADEA, courts could award future damages in
lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is not appropriate-for exam-
ple, when the employer is hostile toward the employee. 195 The court
brushed aside any argument that the uncertainty of front pay made it
unavailable as a remedy, stating that this reason would only serve to
"exonerate a wrongdoer from liability."' 19 6 Citing ways to make front
pay less speculative, the court further dispelled the uncertainty argu-
ment. Factors to be taken into account include: 1) the employee's duty
to mitigate the damages; 2) other employment opportunities available to
the employee; 3) the period in which the employee, exercising "reason-
able efforts," may become reemployed; 4) the employee's work and life
expectancy; and 5) discount tables to figure the present value of future
damages. 197 Also, the court noted that front pay was not speculative in
this case because it involved a pension that had already vested in the
employee. 198 Holding that reinstatement is to be preferred over front
pay, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine why
front pay in this instance would be more appropriate than
reinstatement. 199
Judge Barrett dissented as to the award of future damages,
20 0
agreeing with ChiefJudge Seth's dissent in Blim v. Western Electric Co. ,201
a case in which the Tenth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that front
pay is an available remedy under the ADEA. Judge Seth had acknowl-
edged the ADEA's grant of equitable power to the courts but argued
that it could not be used to "expand or override the limited legal reme-
dies available under the ADEA." ' 20 2 Looking to the Act's legislative his-
tory, Judge Seth concluded in Blim that Congress intended to limit the
193. 763 F.2d at 1171.
194. Id. at 1171-72 (quoting Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp.
1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
195. 763 F.2d at 1172-73. Reinstatement may be inappropriate because of the em-
ployer's animosity, the lack of a comparable job for the employee to re-enter, the em-
ployee's rank in the company, or because the employee's job has been taken. Note, Front
Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 598-601 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Front Pay].
196. 763 F.2d at 1173, (quoting Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. at
1169); see alsoJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1981)
(courts must be willing to accept uncertainty of damages or the wrongdoer will not be held
accountable).
197. 763 F.2d at 1173 (quoting in part Koyen, 560 F. Supp. at 1168-69).
198. See also Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979) (award of pension
benefits plainly authorized under ADEA: part of the "amounts owing . in section
626(b)).
199. 763 F.2d at 1173.
200. Id. at 1175 (Barrett J., dissenting).
201. 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1984).
202. Id. at 1481 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
220 [Vol. 63:2
CIVIL RIGHTS
Act's legal remedies to "unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime
compensation" available under the FLSA, meaning "items of pecuniary
or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits,"
which he claimed did not include front pay.
20 3
4. The Instruction on Willfulness
A final issue the court addressed in Prudential was the employer's
willfulness in violating the ADEA. As discussed earlier, the ADEA incor-
porates the FLSA's remedial provisions. One of these provides for an
award of liquidated damages. 20 4 Congress provided a good faith excep-
tion to FLSA's automatic liquidated damages award through a later act,
the Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA),20 5 but the ADEA does not expressly in-
corporate the PPA section. Likewise, the ADEA's legislative history
does not disclose any congressional intent that the ADEA incorporate
the FLSA's good faith exception. 20 6 Most courts have held that it does
not.
2 0 7
While the liquidated damages award under the FLSA is automatic,
under the ADEA it is only payable where there is a "willful" violation of
the Act.20 8 As the ADEA's legislative history does not define "will-
ful," 20 9 courts must interpret the term when awarding damages.
Before the Supreme Court decided Trans World Airlines v. Thur-
ston,2 10 the circuits were in conflict on what constitutes willfulness and
had established four separate tests. The Fifth Circuit developed the
most liberal test: "Did the employer know the ADEA was in the pic-
ture?" 2 11 The Tenth Circuit adopted this "in the picture" test and ap-
plied it in the earlier Prudential opinion, which was subsequently vacated
203. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 535). It has been argued, however, that the ADEA's legislative
history indicates that Congress' reason for incorporating FLSA remedies was not to limit
remedies under the ADEA, but instead to keep ADEA administration under the Depart-
ment of Labor instead of creating a new bureaucracy. Note, Front Pay, supra note 195, at
593-94. See also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp. Inc. 574 F. Supp. 214, 218-19
(N.D. Ga. 1982). The O'Donnell court found that ADEA section 626(b), which provides
that "amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation," can logically only be
read as authorizing front pay. The court relied on Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) is incorporated into the ADEA at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1982). Liquidated damages are an amount equal to the pecuniary loss of wages, salary
increases and other employment benefits. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1982).
206. Note, Liquidated Damages and Statute of Limitations Under the "Willful" Standard of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and Age Discrimination In Employment Act: Repercussions ofTrans World
Airlines, Inc., v. Thurston, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 516, 529 (1985) [hereinafter cited as, Note,
Liquidated Damages].
207. Note, Liquidated Damages, supra note 206, at 529.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
209. Wehr v. Burroughs, 619 F.2d 276, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1980).
210. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
211. Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 1981); Coleman v. Jiffy
June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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by the Supreme Court.2 12 A more stringent test, the "reckless disre-
gard" test, was adopted by the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits.
21 3
Under this test, a violation was regarded as willful when " 'the employer
. . . knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.' ",214 More stringent still was the
"knowing" test, adopted by the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
2 15
whereby the employer was liable if he acted with knowledge of the Act
or knew or should have known that his actions violated the Act. The
most stringent test was the "specific intent" test, created by the First
Circuit where willfully meant "voluntarily and intentionally, and with
specific intent to do something the law forbids."
2 16
In Thurston, the Supreme Court held that the "reckless disregard"
test is the appropriate test.21 7 The Court rejected the most liberal test,
the "in the picture" test, noting that an employer is required to post
ADEA notices and, therefore, would always know of the Act, thereby
meeting the willfulness test. 2 18 The Court also explicitly rejected the
most stringent test, the "specific intent" test.
2 19
The Supreme Court's position in Thurston as to whether the ADEA
incorporates the FLSA's good faith exception is unclear. In a footnote,
the Court stated that the ADEA did not incorporate section I I of the
PPA (the good faith section). 220 However, elsewhere in the opinion, the
Court found that Trans World Airlines did not willfully violate the
ADEA because it acted "reasonably and in good faith." 22 1 Perhaps this
means that although the ADEA did not specifically incorporate the good
faith exception, courts must consider good faith when determining will-
fulness.2 22 The Tenth Circuit did just that in its subsequent decision in
Prudential.
In Prudential, the trial court had combined the "specific intent" test
with the "knowing" test in its jury instructions on willfulness. 2 23 In its
original decision, the Tenth Circuit rejected this test in favor of the lib-
212. Prudential 1, 741 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S.
Ct. 896 (1985); see also Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 1980).
213. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Burroughs
Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980); Blackwell v. Sun Electric Corp., 696 F.2d 1176,
1184 (6th Cir. 1983).
214. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 624 (1985) (quoting Air
Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983)).
215. Spangnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 860 (1982); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155-56 (7th Cir.
1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1981).
216. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979).
217. 105 S. Ct. at 624.
218. Id. at 625.
219. Id. at 624 n.19. A test requiring anything more than "reckless disregard" would
probably be incorrect. Note, Liquidated Damages, supra note 206, at 539.
220. 105 S. Ct. at 625 n.22.
221. Id. at 626.
222. Note, Liquidated Damages, supra note 206, at 531.
223. Prudential H1, 763 F.2d at 1174. The trial court instructed:
"A willful violation occurs when a person acts with specific intent to violate the
law .... In other words, you can find . .. willful violation of the law ... if you
find . . . that Prudential knew, or should have known . . . that [its decisions]
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eral "in the picture" test. 2 -4 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the decision to be reconsidered in light of Thurston. In its subsequent
decision, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "reckless disregard" test. 2 -5 It
went on to state that "this standard is elucidated by the Court's holding
that a violation is not willful when the employer acts 'reasonably and in
good faith.' "226 The Tenth Circuit concluded that it could not deter-
mine as a matter of law whether Prudential had acted in good faith and
so remanded the case to the trial court to make this determination.
-2 2 7
Nora Kelly
were in violation of the law and were intentionally and knowingly done in viola-
tion thereof."
Id.
224. Prudential 1. 741 F.2d 1225. 1233-34 ( 10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded. 105 S.
Ct. 896 (1985).
225. Prudential 1H. 763 F.2d at 1174.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1175.
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